For
decades, bioweapons have been an integral part of nation states’
arsenals. Their efficiency for military purposes has often been
disputed, as they are not only too slow from a tactical point of view
but also complicated to use. Consequently, very few states have
actually employed bioweapons in the past. During the Second World
War, the Japanese military used various pathogenic agents, such as
for cholera or the plague, to harm the Chinese population. The Cold
War saw a number of accidents in laboratories and on testing grounds
in the Eastern Bloc, during which anthrax and smallpox were released,
resulting in a number of deaths and injuries. Nowadays, various
states have opaque or secret programmes for developing bioweapons,
the trade of which increases the risk of proliferation.
decades, bioweapons have been an integral part of nation states’
arsenals. Their efficiency for military purposes has often been
disputed, as they are not only too slow from a tactical point of view
but also complicated to use. Consequently, very few states have
actually employed bioweapons in the past. During the Second World
War, the Japanese military used various pathogenic agents, such as
for cholera or the plague, to harm the Chinese population. The Cold
War saw a number of accidents in laboratories and on testing grounds
in the Eastern Bloc, during which anthrax and smallpox were released,
resulting in a number of deaths and injuries. Nowadays, various
states have opaque or secret programmes for developing bioweapons,
the trade of which increases the risk of proliferation.
So
far, there have merely been rumours about the misuse of genetic
research in the military realm and for operations contrary to
international law. Apparently, the North Korean biologist Ri Chae Woo
worked on a bioweapon designed to recognise and kill individuals
based on their genetic characteristics. Ri was reported to have tried
fleeing to the Australian consulate in the Chinese city of Guangzhou
on September 5, 2003, but has been missing since. The Australian
House of Representatives discussed this largely unknown incident
(Questions On Notice, Foreign
Affairs: North Korea, Question 2385, Monday, October 13, 2003).
Nevertheless, reports on North Korean defectors who claim to have
witnessed such experiments on humans have yet to be verified.
far, there have merely been rumours about the misuse of genetic
research in the military realm and for operations contrary to
international law. Apparently, the North Korean biologist Ri Chae Woo
worked on a bioweapon designed to recognise and kill individuals
based on their genetic characteristics. Ri was reported to have tried
fleeing to the Australian consulate in the Chinese city of Guangzhou
on September 5, 2003, but has been missing since. The Australian
House of Representatives discussed this largely unknown incident
(Questions On Notice, Foreign
Affairs: North Korea, Question 2385, Monday, October 13, 2003).
Nevertheless, reports on North Korean defectors who claim to have
witnessed such experiments on humans have yet to be verified.
Intelligence
operations such as the assassination of the North Korean dictator’s
brother Kim Jong Nam in Malaysia in 2017 or of the former GRU
employee Skripal in the UK in 2018 show that chemical weapons are a
common choice when political opponents or alleged traitors are to be
liquidated. In practice, bioweapons are not only unpredictable and
put the attacker at risk of contagion but the sensitive pathogens
must also be kept alive throughout the process.
operations such as the assassination of the North Korean dictator’s
brother Kim Jong Nam in Malaysia in 2017 or of the former GRU
employee Skripal in the UK in 2018 show that chemical weapons are a
common choice when political opponents or alleged traitors are to be
liquidated. In practice, bioweapons are not only unpredictable and
put the attacker at risk of contagion but the sensitive pathogens
must also be kept alive throughout the process.
Non-state
actors generally pose a far greater threat – as far as I compiled corresponding incidents here:
actors generally pose a far greater threat – as far as I compiled corresponding incidents here:
|
Year
|
Actor
|
Country
|
Weapon
|
Produced
|
Stored
|
Employed
|
|
1972
|
Right-wing
|
USA
|
Typhus
|
Unknown
|
Yes
|
No
|
|
1981
|
Environmental
extremists |
UK
|
Anthrax
|
Unknown
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
1984
|
Religious
cult |
USA
|
Salmonella
|
Unknown
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
1992
|
Right-wing
|
USA
|
Ricin
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
No
|
|
1993
|
Right-wing
|
USA
|
Ricin
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
No
|
|
1990s
|
Religious
cult |
Japan
|
Anthrax,
Botulinum, Q Fever (+ Sarin) |
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
2001
|
Unclear
|
USA
|
Anthrax
|
Unknwon
|
Unknown
|
Yes
|
|
2003
|
Islamists
|
UK
|
Ricin
|
Unclear
|
Unclear
|
No
|
|
2004
|
Islamists
|
France
|
Botulinum,
Ricin |
Unclear
|
Unclear
|
No
|
|
2018
|
Islamists
|
Germany
|
Ricin
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
No
|
Aside
from specific incidents, one can find in the Dark Web numerous hints, documents and
statements about the production and deployment of bioweapons from
various sides of the terrorist, extremist and religious spectrum.
from specific incidents, one can find in the Dark Web numerous hints, documents and
statements about the production and deployment of bioweapons from
various sides of the terrorist, extremist and religious spectrum.
Since this topic is not only thrilling, but also important, I just published a new paper with Janes Intelligence Review, titled “Dark web users show interest in ricin”. This and other texts can be found here.
