As may be expected in a vast complex obsessed with discretion, or even the strictest secrecy, the public may be only vaguely conscious of what could be developing in the American intelligence community in the midst of the incoming US Trump Administration’s massive policy and government upheavals.
Instead, the outside world can only surmise that what was probably the modern world’s most sophisticated intelligence system may be subjected to the same kind of political turmoil experienced in Washington, the Pentagon and other parts of the country’s security complex.
By nature, information about the number of agencies and persons involved has been fragmentary and infrequent. This US intelligence community in the past has been identified as involving 18 separate civilian or defense agencies, with perhaps close to one million persons with security clearance for classified information, and a budget estimated in the past at some $65 billion.
The first actions by this second Trump Administration in 2025 have been as confusing as its initial days in office in January 2017. Then, on his first day on January 21, President Trump visited CIA headquarters and showered it with praise, noting “we are on the same wavelength,” and “ I love you, I respect you. There’s nobody I respect more. You’re going to do a fantastic job. And we’re going to start winning again, and you’re going to be leading the charge.”
But by the time of the July Helsinki Summit with Vladimir Putin, Trump seemed to dismiss earlier findings by the same US intelligence community of Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election campaign, saying “”President Putin says it’s not Russia. I don’t see any reason why it would be.”
The first confusing signals of the second Trump Administration in 2025 appeared just as contradictory but this time at a rapid and disruptive rate.
For a brief period in March, the Trump foreign and intelligence policy leadership showed its willingness to manipulate the flow of intelligence to pressure President Zelensky and Ukraine into acceding to the US peace plan for a cease-fire in the three-year conflict in Europe. Reports began emerging a few days earlier of an American “pause” on Britain forwarding intelligence originating in the US to Ukraine, later officially confirmed by US National Security Adviser Mike Walz. The next day, Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth appeared to contradict such action. For several days after, there were no other public communications from this or other parts of the vast intel establishment. It was only after the March 11 meeting in Saudi Arabia between US and Ukrainian delegations who agreed on a joint position on a 30-day cease-fire to present to Russia, that it was announced that the US would resume US intelligence, including commercial satellite data, to Ukraine.
However just as fundamental questions have arisen over the possible degradation of this US intelligence capacity as a result of extensive manpower and budget revisions exercised by Elon Musk and his unofficial “department of government efficiency,” intent on manpower and budget reductions or his team’s reported mishandling of private CIA data on personnel hirings that could lead to identification of former agents.
As significant could be the apparent historic strategic shift in the US Administration and Government from traditional Western and NATO allies to Russia or other authoritarian or populist partners, that would inherently alter intelligence gathering and dissemination. The change in policy concerning Ukraine is of course one example, resulting in even interdiction of Kiev’s access to commercial satellite traffic.
But would other traditional partners such as Britain’s MI5, MI6 or GCHQ eventually also be frozen out. An extreme question stemming from the reorientation would revolve around whether US intelligence priority would shift from traditional targets such as Russia toward seeking to penetrate data from traditional allies. Trump has frequently attacked EU and other allies for practicing unfair treatment and advantage over the US in trade and economic relations. A recent political example was illustrated in the US verbal and media criticism and attack of Romanian election practices, with US criticism of that country’s Constitutional Court and electoral commission decisions against extreme right-wing candidate Calin Gerogescu’s, allegedly for benefitting from massive Russia interference in the campaign.
Given so many troubling factors, it might be expected that traditional European and other American allies, foremost among them the global Five Eyes intelligence sharing network would be considering “derisking” their relations with the American intelligence community and reviewing their own information sharing with the US.
Just a few weeks into the Trump Administration’s takeover of key leadership and direction of the US intelligence and security complex, major allies were casting some doubt about continuing the traditional trust which had prevailed since the end of World War II.
March 5, four recent British Ambassadors to the US, told the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee that the “fundamental change” in US leadership and policies had shaken their trust and would lead to a hesitation in the UK continuing to share intelligence as before. One remarked that some top US intelligence appointments had “a strange track record” and “attitudes toward allies…and Russia.” Another suggested that while the historic “interoperability” might be continued at the working level, but that at the “top level, they need to be circumspect.” It was further believed that the American intelligence arm had been “hollowed out…A lot of good people were thrown out.”
Major examples of the turmoil impact also surfaced on the other side of the globe in Australia or in Europe during the growing discussion there over a reinforced European defence effort.
Some of the most detailed and profound discussion of the situation went public in Australia where a top international foreign and security strategist, Rory Medcalf, wittily referred to “Five Eyes wide shut,” and other comments appeared. Writing extensively in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s The Strategist, Chris White traced the possible expectations for the American intelligence community as revealed in the US conservative Heritage Foundation Project 2025. He noted that the think tank’s section on intelligence was undoubtedly influenced if not dictated by John Ratcliff, who became the Trump nominee and now Directs the CIA. White’s detailed examination observed: “Australia has no room for complacency as it watches the second Trump Administration upend the US Intelligence Community (USIC)… Australia’s National Intelligence Community (NIC) will need to adopt a more deliberate and coordinated approach to its relationship with the USIC, centred around agreed national objectives.”
Likewise, the past apparent carelessness and mishandling of restricted and classified documents in packing boxes by President Trump himself at his Florida resort are another troublesome factor. An underlying indication in his first term of office, despite his retaining possession of classified documents, suggested that he had little trust or patience for such output from the intelligence agencies. This would seem to be especially the case in view of the fact that in his second term, Trump has carried out an acceleration of this earlier conduct. Drastic reductions in leadership and personnel, as well as the appointments of ideological supporters to these agencies could also have profound impact on US intelligence focus and output.
Amidst the flurry of chaotic information emerging from Washington connecting with the frenzied Musk-led efficiency and cost-reduction campaign has also suggested that CIA personnel were also offered employment departure financial incentives and that hundreds or thousands of personnel could be fired.
The leadership at the Department of Defence, from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Inspector Generals were instantly and unceremoniously disposed of by the incoming Trump Administration. In the first few days of his first term of office from 2016 to 2220 then-President Donald J. Trump made no secret of his disdain for this faceless mass he equated with a conspiratorial “deep state” undermining or sabotaging his ambitions, by venting his anger publicly at Central Intelligence Agency headquarters.
Overtly at least, many, if not all, key Trump team appointments in the security sector, have voiced or been associated with anti-establishment and revisionist policies, as typified by the broader Musk DOGE undertaking which has questioned and threatened the very concept of government employment or civil service. After a few weeks in office, millions of such civil servants have been living in complete uncertainty.
Commenting on the Atlantic magazine’s podcast about the purge, veteran author Shaine Harris remarked “it makes everyone less safe, because if any country is holding back on information, arguably, that is potentially making everybody less informed and less aware, which could have real-world implications.” While he noted that no international source had indicated any abrupt effect, Harris added that the veteran Presidential Adviser Peter Navarro had suggested excluding Canada from the Five Eyes coalition. In the Atlantic article entitled “Five Eyes have noticed,” Harris noted further: “And some of them have said to me, Look. You know, while you guys, basically, can’t get your stuff together, and you’re kind of in chaos, we worry that that’s going to have a downstream negative effect on us, because you’re so distracted by politics and internal witch hunts and, you know, personnel matters that maybe you’re taking the eye off the ball, and we’re not getting the usual high quality of intelligence that we depend on.”
Historically, the CIA, NSA and other intelligence agencies and some of their employees have not always been beyond reproach or behaved as objective or disinterested actors. From the 1980s investigation by Senator Frank Church to revelation of later disclosure of eavesdropping and wiretapping, torture or waterboarding in Afganistan, curtains have been raised on abuses by the agencies and operatives. But the ability for Congress or the public to monitor and audit these operations of the agencies, was seriously undermined by the Trump Administrations firings of Inspector Generals.
On assuming office February 12, the incoming Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Tulsi Gabbard, a former Member of the House of Representatives and a military veteran, remarked: “Unfortunately, trust in the Intelligence Community is at an all-time low. President Trump’s reelection is a clear mandate from the American people to end the weaponization and politicization of the IC. As DNI, I look forward to working with those who are charged with the critical mission of securing our nation to do just that.”
Two days later, she told the Munich Security Conference: “The President is focused on ending the killing and brutality in the war between Russia and Ukraine and preventing nuclear war. He continues to be focused on countering radical Islamist terrorism, the proliferation of drugs like fentanyl, and targeting those profiting from human trafficking. He designated cartels as foreign terrorist organizations and invoked the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 to eliminate foreign gangs and criminal networks from our country. He is overhauling the trade system to recognize the principles of fair play and reciprocity, signaling America will insist on a level economic playing field.”
Beginning with the singling out the international terrorist threat, she then noted: “The challenges presented by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea similarly demand a united front to advance the cause of peace, freedom, and prosperity. To deter aggression and maintain stability, we look forward to working closely with those who share those interests.”
Despite such declarations and the Administration’s stern line toward China, there has been no acknowledgement or even informal indication of the continuation of the operation of the CIA’s relatively new Mission Center on China. The concentrated priority focused on China was only decided by the Biden Administration and constituted one of the few times such a team effort had publicly been revealed. Tabard herself, a former soldier, Congresswoman from Hawaii and briefly Democratic Presidential candidate, has in the past held outspoken positions in support of China, Russia, the former Syrian regime and other controversial statements.
Australia’s ASPI author Chris White wrote recently that CIA Director John Ratcliff’s seeming obsession in his Congressional nomination hearing with the China threat would seem to indicate a continuing Agency concentration on the PRC in the future.
It is probably likely that there would be no clear or definite public information about the outcome of these political undercurrents and muffled rumblings. Yet the endgame or the continuation of a debate, are bound to be of significant international impact. It is also uncertain whether there will eventually be adequate impartial Congressional oversight or evaluation of this process or its perceived development.
Weeks after the swearing in of John Ratcliffe, formerly a short-time DNI in the first Trump Administration, as Director of CIA, there have been no substantive updates of information from the Agency’s McLean headquarters, speeches or official statements.
Few unofficial media in the New York Times or other sources have filtered out regarding the situation in the CIA or other elements of the vast intelligence community.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in late February or early was unofficially said to have declared suspension of US cybersecurity and information activities against Russia.This information, was said not to have affected the National Security Agency, which is largely charged with monitoring external telecommunications and other signals intelligence.
In addition, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer was asked on different occasions at Question Time March 5 about information that the US had requested that the UK not share intelligence with Ukraine and additionally that the long-standing joint Five Eyes international intelligence sharing agreement between the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand was in jeopardy. Starmer did not address these and other related Parliament questions cautiously since they were “live” issues, but only volunteered that the US remained a reliable partner.
The House of Commons’ Prime Minister’s question time also touched on another aspect of the larger issue of intelligence sharing, especially the almost-legendary “five eyes” club, which conceivably could also be affected by the expected massive reductions in staff or other possible restrictions promulgated by the new administration.
An ancillary question must also be whether the other European or other like-minded countries can make up for the decline in the quantity or quality of US human or signals intelligence transfer not only to Ukraine but among themselves.
In the absence of solid information about the policies, working and staffing, the best the public may hope for would be informed speculations by former agents or leaders, or knowledgeable academics and observers. One of the first such specialists to surface in the current phase has been John Kiriakou, who spent 15 years at the CIA. In a lengthy interview with Youtuber Dalton Fischer, Kiriakou noted that the CIA had willingly sent partial names of 3000 agents hired within the past three years on a probation period, to Elon Musk’s team, in violation of security rules, possibly the more general Espionage Act, to an an unclassified White House E-mail address. He suggested that probably few qualified CIA agents with classified access and linguistic or other training, would have accepted the Musk departure offer, and only general back office administration, might have accepted and left. But he added that only Congress could create Musk’s operation: “It’s just made up,” he added, also observing that they are paid by Musk’s private organisation. “It’s a circus.”
Stephan Blancke 
Bodo Wegmann